

NSF Workshop  
Applied Mathematics for Deregulated Power Systems:  
Optimization, Control and Computational Intelligence  
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## Power System Security

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
## Outline

- Power system security
  - » Current practice
  - » Lesson from 2003 blackout
- A new approach to power system security analysis
  - » Security regions
- Challenges in power systems
  - » Mathematical theory
  - » Control-theoretic issues
  - » Information technology and enhanced intelligence
  - » Brain power shortage

## Power System Reliability and Security

- Service **reliability**
  - » Continuity of service, without interruption
  - » In the face of constant disturbances or contingencies (generator and transmission outages)
- System **security**
  - » Ability to withstand contingencies
  - » Set requirement for generation reserve and limit to transmission loading
  - » Avoidance of cascading outages leading to blackout



## Control Centers



- Control center (energy management system)
  - » Real-time security monitoring and control (SCADA)
- Network security software
  - » State estimation
  - » Contingency analysis
  - » Security-constrained economic dispatch
  - » Security redispatch
- Remote control
  - » Automatic generation control
  - » Transmission switching
  - » Load shedding

## ICCP Network


- Inter-control center communication protocol (ICCP)
- TASE.2 (Technical Application Service Element)
  - » IEC standards



## 2003 North America Blackout

The most serious reliability/security breach in the history of electric power systems


How come?



3:32-3:41 pm  
Critical moments

- 3:36 MISO “I wonder what is going on there”  
“Something strange is happening”
- 3:48 PJM to MISO regarding two disconnected lines.  
MISO “I have not had the chance to investigate it.  
There is too much going on right now”.
- 3:57 FE to MISO “Do you have any idea on what is going on?” “We have no clue!”  
MISO “I can’t get a big picture of what’s going on”  
“Strange things are happening all at the same time”

- State estimation was not working. Security analysis and control tools did not seem to have been employed.
- Why not?
  - » Too much data, too little useful information.
  - » Scenario-based simulation tools are ineffective.



4:10:00-4:10:38 pm  
Cascading Outages


- Contingency had not been studied.
  - » Initial transmission loading
  - » Subsequent voltage collapse
- Difficulty in predicting scenarios with fast changing operating conditions.
- Real-time security control tools are mostly for *real-power* only
  - Nonlinearity of voltage and reactive power.
  - Decoupling of real and reactive power
  - Complexity in mathematics

## A New Approach

- A new approach
  - » To address the shortcomings of existing methods
- An interdisciplinary team
  - » Electrical engineering, applied mathematics, computer sciences, ...
  - » **HK**: Univ. of Hong Kong; **China**: Tsinghua U., Tianjin U., Academy of Science, etc.



## Security Regions

- **Security region** is defined in the space of **controllable market variables**
- It is the operating region in which the power system is secure.
- Change in configurations changes the shape of the region.
- Changing operating state (due to contracts, ...) moves the point around.
- **Boundary** of security region gives the limitation imposed by the security constraints.



## ATC and CM

- Space of controllable market variables
  - » Manageable dimension
  - » Provides useful information
- A unified approach
  - » Steady-state (real power and voltages)
  - » Small-disturbance (voltage stability)
  - » Transient stability
- Region-wise vs point-wise
  - » Available transfer capability
  - » Congestion management



- Provides feasible region in which to overlay objective functions for decision-making

## Steady-State Security Regions

- Power system in steady-state

$$f(x, u) = 0$$

$$g(x, u) \leq 0$$

$x$ : state variables.

$u$ : controllable market variables

(quantities that are controllable by market participants and grid operator)

- Steady-state security region

$$\Omega_s = \{u : f(x, u) = 0, g(x, u) \leq 0\}$$

- Boundary of steady-state security region  $\partial\Omega_s$

## Small Disturbance Security Region

- Birfurcation and voltage instability
  - » Saddle node
  - » Hopf
- Small disturbance security region

$$\Omega_{sd} = \{u : F_x(x, u) \text{ nonsingular} \}$$

- Boundary of small disturbance security region  $\partial\Omega_{sd}$

## Dynamic Security Region

<i>Pre fault</i>	<i>Fault-on</i>	<i>Post-fault</i>
$0 = F(x, u)$	$\dot{y} = F_1(y, u)$	$\dot{z} = F_2(z, u)$
$(x, u)$	$y(t) = \mathbf{f}(t, x, u)$	$sep : z_s(u)$
	$y(t_F) = \mathbf{f}(t_F, x, u)$	$SR(z_s(u))$

- **Dynamic security region**

$$\Omega_d = \{u : \mathbf{f}(u) \in SR(z_s(u))\}$$

- Boundary of dynamic security region  $\partial\Omega_d$

## Research Issues

- Characterize boundary of security regions.
- Determine whether the changed state is inside or outside the security region ([security assessment](#)).
- If it is inside the security region, what is the range in which market participants can engage in further trades ([available transfer capability](#))
- If it is outside the security region, what are ways to bring it to the boundary of the security region ([congestion management](#)).
- Computational algorithms.

## Approach

- Solve one-dimensional  $u$  sub problem first.
  - » Applications: fixed allocation ATC and CM.
- For multi-dimensional  $u$ 
  - » Patching up local boundary segments from one-dimensional solutions.
- Computational efforts
  - » Off-line: one-dimensional problems
  - » On-line: decision-making in the space of multi-dimensional  $u$ .

## Steady-state ATC

- For one-dimensional  $u$ , the problem is how far  $\lambda$  is the boundary from the current state  $u_0$

$$f(x, u_0 + \mathbf{I}u) = 0$$


$$g(x, u_0 + \mathbf{I}u) \leq 0$$

- Which inequality constraint  $g_i(x, u_0 + \mathbf{I}u) = 0$  to hit first?

- Reformulate the problem using the pointwise maximum function

$$F(x, \mathbf{I}) = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} f(x, \mathbf{I}) \\ \max_i \{g_i(x, \mathbf{I})\} \end{array} \right\} = 0$$

- $F(x, \lambda)$  is a semi-smooth function.



## Smoothing Function

- The semi-smooth function can be solved by semi-smooth Newton method. However, global convergence is difficult to obtain.
- An approach using the following smoothing function is taken:

$$g_s(t, y) = \begin{cases} t \ln(\sum e^{g_i(y)/t}), & \text{if } t \neq 0 \\ \max\{g_i(y)\}, & \text{if } t = 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } y = (x, \mathbf{I})$$

- Efficient algorithms have been developed and global convergence proved.


## ATC Limited by Saddle Node Bifurcation

- Moore-Spence

$$F(x, \mathbf{I}) = 0$$

$$F_x(x, \mathbf{I}) y = 0$$

$$l^T y = 1$$



- Algorithmic improvement with decomposition-coordination.

## Boundary of Stability Region

- Post-fault system dynamics

$$\dot{z} = F(z)$$

- Boundary of stability region

$$\partial SR(z_s) = \bigcup_{z_e^1 \in \partial AR} W^s(z_e^1)$$

- Local characterization

$$W^s(z_e^1) = \{h(z) = 0 \mid L_F h = \mathbf{m} \cdot h, h(z_e^1) = 0\}$$

$$\text{where } L_F h = \langle F(z), h_z(z) \rangle$$

$\mathbf{m}$  is the unstable eigenvalue at  $z_e^1$

## Boundary of Dynamic Security Region

- Dynamic security region

$$\Omega_d = \{u : \mathbf{f}(u) \in SR(z_s(u))\}$$

- Boundary of dynamic security region

$$\partial\Omega_d = \{u : \mathbf{f}(u) \in \partial SR(z_s(u))\}$$

- Local boundary of dynamic security region

$$\{u : h(\mathbf{f}(u), u) = 0\}$$

## Boundary Approximation

- Quadric approximation

$$h_Q(z, u_0) = [z - z_u(u_0)]^T \mathbf{h}(u_0) + [z - z_u(u_0)]^T Q(u_0) [z - z_u(u_0)] / 2$$

where  $\mathbf{h}$  is left unstable eigenvector of the Jacobian at  $z_e$

$Q$  is the solution of  $CQ + QC^T = H$ ,  $C = (\mathbf{m}I / 2 - J^T)$  and  $H = \sum \mathbf{h}_i \text{Hess}(F_i)$

- Changing  $u$ ,  $u = u_0 + \mathbf{I}\Delta u$

$$h_Q(z, u) = [z - z_u(u)]^T \mathbf{h}(u) + [z - z_u(u)]^T Q(u) [z - z_u(u)] / 2$$

- Approximation

$$h_{AQ}(z, u_0 + \mathbf{I}\Delta u) = [z - (z_u(u_0) + \frac{\partial Z_u}{\partial u} \mathbf{I}\Delta u)]^T (\mathbf{h}(u_0) + \mathbf{h}_u \mathbf{I}\Delta u)$$

$$+ [z - (z_u(u_0) + \frac{\partial Z_u}{\partial u} \mathbf{I}\Delta u)]^T [Q(u_0) + Q_u \mathbf{I}\Delta u] [z - (z_u(u_0) + \frac{\partial Z_u}{\partial u} \mathbf{I}\Delta u)]$$

## Dynamic ATC


- Fault-on trajectory

$$f(u) \approx f(u_0) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial u} I \Delta u$$

- Approximate boundary of dynamic security region



$$h_{AQ}(f(u_0) + \frac{\partial f}{\partial u} I \Delta u, u_0 + I \Delta u) = 0$$

- Quadratic function of  $\lambda$  that can readily be solved.



## Congestion Management

- Dual problem of ATC



## Broader Issues

- The research effort reported here is only a small part of what is needed.
- Root causes of blackout
  - » Lack of basic understanding of power systems
  - » Mismatch of analysis tools in the new environment
  - » Slow progress in automation and intelligence
  - » Shortage of brain power

## Challenges: Mathematical Theory

- The 2003 North America blackout exposed the inadequacy of tools for power system security
  - » Too much data, not enough useful information
  - » Scenario-based simulation is ineffective
  - » Theoretical understanding of nonlinear power system dynamics is inadequate
- It is time for more theoretical research to develop alternatives to complement scenario-based simulation paradigm: mathematical theory to understand the complex dynamic behavior of large-scale interconnected power systems utilizing modern nonlinear mathematics.

## Challenges: Control-theoretic Issues

- We are using tools not designed for the (restructured) system to deal with problems arising from our using the system not the way it was designed.
  - » Fundamental conflict between centralized optimization and decentralized competitive market
- It is time to free ourselves from centralized optimization paradigm and for innovative research in various dimensions of control-theoretic issues of:
  - » information structure
  - » decision making
  - » Coordination

## Challenges: Enhancing Intelligence

- We are not using the best available technologies to manage the system.
  - » Slow progress in automation and intelligentization
- It is time for more research in effective utilization of modern computer, communication and control technologies to make the system highly intelligent.

## Challenges: Brain Power Shortage

- We are not attracting the best talents to the profession
  - » Many major US engineering schools do not have a power program any more (MIT, Stanford, Berkeley...)
  - » Power engineers salary is lower than the average engineer.
    - Median: \$73,625 vs. \$82,000 (-10%)
    - Highest 10%: \$107,000 vs. \$132,000 (-19%)
- It is time for government to provide significant funding to universities to conduct innovative research that would attract creative-minded faculty and students, and for industry to change employment attitude.